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Marriage equality has swept America. Numerous federal judges,
including Western District of Wisconsin Judge Barbara Crabb, have
invalidated state proscriptions on same-sex marriage. This paper
scrutinizes U.S. litigation, Crabb’s opinion, Seventh Circuit
affirmance, and Supreme Court resolution. Finding that Wisconsin
shows how to efficaciously institute full marriage equality, even as
other states have not, the piece affords future suggestions.
I. MARRIAGE EQUALITY LITIGATION
United States v. Windsor1 triggered the new cases2 in all states
which banned same-sex marriage.3 The Court ruled that the Defense of
∗
Williams Chair, Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of
Law. Thanks to Peggy Sanner and Katie Lehnen for valuable ideas, Leslee Stone for
excellent processing, as well as Russell Williams and the Hunton Williams Summer
Endowment Fund for generous, continuing support. Remaining errors are mine.
1.
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); see Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and
Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 871–74 (2014).
2.
Most cite it. See, e.g., Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 987 (W.D.
Wis. 2014). For marriage equality analyses, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE
CLOSET TO THE ALTAR (2013); MARC SOLOMON, WINNING MARRIAGE (2014). State
constitutions and statutes include bans. See, e.g., WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13 (“Only a
marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage
in this state.”); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 86 (“Marriage is a legal relationship between
a man and a woman that is created by civil contract.”).
3.
The ACLU pursued the Wisconsin case, see Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at
986, but local parties and counsel have pursued numerous others, see, e.g., Bostic v.
Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459–60 (E.D. Va. 2014).
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Marriage Act (DOMA)4 violated the Constitution5 by harming dignity,
financial, and other interests of same-sex couples and their children.6 It
praised federalism without treating state bans.7 In dissent, Chief Justice
John Roberts asserted that the Court did not address their validity,8
while Justice Antonin Scalia agreed but presciently claimed that the
arguments for striking down DOMA could similarly govern the bans.9
Almost thirty federal district court judges overturned limitations; two
upheld them.10 Four circuit courts of appeals affirmed invalidations,
ruling that bans violated the Equal Protection11 and Due Process
Clauses.12 On November 6, 2014, the Sixth Circuit upheld bans, and on
January 16, 2015, the Court granted certiorari.13
II. WISCONSIN LITIGATION
A. District Court
In February 2014, plaintiffs challenged Wisconsin’s laws, and that
June, Judge Barbara Crabb invalidated them in Wolf v. Walker.14 The
parties agreed that marriage is central to society, which she linked with
“our sense of self, personal autonomy and public dignity.”15 This
required scrutiny to ascertain whether the bans violated constitutional
guarantees, which prompted her conclusion that “defendants are . . .

4.
Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012).
5.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696; see Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and
Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 140–42
(2013).
6.
It seemed to use elevated scrutiny. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–96. But
see Franklin, supra note 1, at 872 (noting that lower federal and state courts disagree
about what standard of review the Court applied).
7.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–96.
8.
Id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see Klarman, supra note 5, at 158.
9.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Franklin, supra
note 1, at 870.
10.
See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, LOVE AND THE LAW: FEDERAL CASES
CHALLENGING STATE BANS ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2015), http://www.afj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/Federal-Marriage-Equality-Report-6.23.15-POSITIVE.pdf
11.
Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d
648 (7th Cir. 2014).
12.
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755
F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014).
13.
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S.
Ct. 1039–41 (2015) (mem.); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Decide Marriage Rights
for Gay Couples Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2015), http://nyti.ms/15eovQN.
14.
986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
15.
Id. at 987.
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denying equal citizenship to plaintiffs” by not allowing their marriage.16
When the state deprives a whole “class of citizens of a right as
fundamental as marriage,” it must at least show that this advances a
legitimate interest apart from a desire to maintain the status quo.17
Crabb found “[un]persuasive” arguments to immunize the ban
from review. Baker v. Nelson18 was not controlling when later doctrinal
developments made it suspect,19 as the Court “has denounced the view
implicit in cases such as Baker that gay persons are ‘strangers to the
law.’”20 She analyzed the idea that judges should not question state
voters’ decisions about whether and when to permit same-sex
marriage21 but decided that a general federalism interest, although
important, could not trump the Fourteenth Amendment,22 which grants
federal courts well-established power to determine whether state laws
violate individuals’ constitutional rights.23
Crabb assessed the review standard for whether bans denied a
fundamental due process right to marry and equal protection by
discriminating against plaintiffs on “the basis of sex and sexual
orientation.”24 She asserted, “The ‘liberty’ protected by the due process
clause . . . includes the ‘fundamental right’ to marry, a conclusion that
the Supreme Court has reaffirmed many times.”25 The Justices have
16.
Id. (“[M]arriage is not merely an accumulation of benefits. It is a
fundamental mark of citizenship.” (quoting Andrew Sullivan, State of the Union, NEW
REPUBLIC (May 8, 2000), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/75716/state-theunion)).
17.
Id. at 987–88 (“[P]ersonal beliefs, anxiety about change and discomfort
about an unfamiliar way of life must give way to a respect for the constitutional rights
of individuals . . . .”).
18.
409 U.S. 810 (1972) (summarily dismissing “for want of a substantial
federal question”).
19.
Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 988–91.
20.
Id. at 990–91 (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)). “To
the extent Romer and Lawrence left any room for doubt whether the claims in this case
raise a substantial federal question, that doubt was resolved in United States v.
Windsor . . . .” Id. at 990 (citation omitted).
21.
Id. at 993–97. Wisconsin based this on federalism and marriage regulation
as a traditional state matter. Id. at 994.
22.
Id. “States may not ‘experiment’ with different social policies by violating
constitutional rights.” Id.
23.
Id. She said that the Court in Windsor used “DOMA’s encroachment on
state authority as evidence that the law was unconstitutional,” id. at 997, and Schuette
v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014), “said nothing about
state laws . . . that require discrimination.” Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 996.
24.
Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 997. Each clause poses review standard issues,
and the rights that each insures “frequently overlap.” Id. at 997 (quoting Goodridge v.
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 953 (Mass. 2003)).
25.
Id. at 997–98 (collecting cases).
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stated that “‘[w]hen a statutory classification significantly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right’ . . . the law ‘cannot be upheld
unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is
closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.’”26 Crabb analyzed
the right’s scope, asking whether the “wish to marry someone of the
same-sex falls within the right to marry already firmly established in
Supreme Court precedent,” finding it does.27 She treated marriage’s
purposes, rejecting procreation as the sole reason for constitutional
protection, since the Supreme Court has never made this a
requirement.28 Because the state offered no reason that same-sex
couples cannot fulfill marriage’s purposes “just as well as opposite-sex
couples,” Crabb interpreted the right to include same-sex marriage29
and concluded the issue is whether a right exists “from which same-sex
couples can be excluded.”30
She addressed the claim that same-sex marriage’s inclusion would
contradict Washington v. Glucksberg,31 in which the Court “stated that
its substantive-due-process jurisprudence . . . has been a process
whereby the outlines of the liberty specially protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . have . . . been carefully refined by concrete examples
involving fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal
tradition.”32 Crabb had difficulty squaring that case with two in which
the “Court recognized . . . rights . . . [not] ‘deeply rooted’ in the
country’s legal tradition at the time.”33 She found that Glucksberg
“involved the question whether a right to engage in certain conduct . . .
should be expanded to include a right to engage in different conduct,”34
whereas “the conduct at issue [in Wolf] [wa]s exactly the same as that
already protected: getting married.”35 Crabb said two major cases show
“that the state cannot rely on a history of exclusion to narrow the scope
of [a] right,”36 which “must be framed in neutral terms to prevent

26.
Id. at 998 (first alteration in original) (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 388 (1978)).
27.
Id. at 998–99.
28.
Id. at 999.
29.
Id. at 1000.
30.
Id. at 1001.
31.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
32.
Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1001–02 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
33.
Id. at 1002 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
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arbitrary exclusions of entire classes of people,”37 and history is not
determinative, especially given more recent legal and societal
changes.38 She concluded that Wisconsin laws interfere significantly
with the right to marry, so they required support in “sufficiently
important state interests . . . closely tailored to effectuate only these
interests.”39
Crabb treated the equal protection claim,40 saying that “[m]ost
classifications must be upheld against [an] equal protection challenge if
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.”41 However, elevated review may
apply.42 For a “suspect” classification, the Supreme Court uses “strict
scrutiny,” which requires that states show the classification is
“narrowly tailored” to attain a “compelling” interest.43 For others,
namely gender, the Justices employ “intermediate scrutiny,” so
“classifications must be substantially related to the achievement of an
important governmental objective.”44
Plaintiffs argued for elevated scrutiny, as the ban discriminates
based on sex and sexual orientation.45 Because the Supreme Court and
Seventh Circuit had not endorsed the first, Crabb eschewed it.46 As to
sexual orientation discrimination, she found that the Supreme Court has
never explicitly applied heightened review, but some assert that two
cases show it uses elevated review.47 Crabb, thus, assessed the criteria
that the Justices apply: “(1) whether the class has been subjected to a
history of discrimination; (2) whether individuals in the class are able to
contribute to society to the same extent as others; (3) whether the

37.
Id. at 1003.
38.
Id.; see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (“[H]istory and tradition are the
starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process
inquiry.” (alteration in original) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
39.
Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1006 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 388 (1978)).
40.
She did so because defendants would probably appeal. Id.
41.
Id. at 1007 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313
(1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42.
Id.
43.
Id. (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701 (2007); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976)).
44.
Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
45.
Id.
46.
Id. at 1007–09.
47.
Id. at 1009–10. Absent clearer guidance, it was difficult to rely on Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), or United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013),
to apply that scrutiny. Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1010–11.
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characteristic defining the class is immutable; and (4) whether the class
is politically powerless.”48 She analyzed immutability, deeming sexual
orientation basic to a person’s identity, even if not immutable.49 Crabb
found that the last criterion was not relevant;50 the idea “would be
challenging to apply” and “it is difficult to understand why a group’s
political power should be determinative.”51 Insofar as the concept is
pertinent, she thought it best stated “as whether the class is inherently
vulnerable in the context of the ordinary political process, either
because of its size or history of disenfranchisement.”52 Given “that gay
persons make up only a small percentage of the population and that
there is no dispute that they have been subjected to a history of
discrimination,” Crabb easily concluded that this factor was met.53
In short, sexual orientation discrimination received elevated
scrutiny but was most akin to sex among the classifications with this
protection.54 “Because sex discrimination receives intermediate scrutiny
and the difference between intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny is
not dispositive,” she used intermediate scrutiny, so Wisconsin had to
show that its ban was substantially related to attaining an important
state goal.55 Crabb, thus, assessed whether the state had shown that the
ban furthers a legitimate purpose and found that the interests advanced
were like those urged by jurisdictions in other ban cases and the
DOMA defenders56 in Windsor that the Supreme Court did not credit.57
However, deciding whether Windsor controlled was unnecessary

48.
Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (citations omitted) (quoting Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313). She said all courts
considering the issue since Windsor found that each “applies to sexual orientation
discrimination.” Id. at 1012 (citations omitted). Defendants did not contest the first
two. Id.
49.
Id. at 1013.
50.
Id. at 1013–14.
51.
Id. at 1014.
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
Id. (“The Supreme Court has not explained how to distinguish a ‘suspect’
classification from a ‘quasi-suspect’ classification, but sexual orientation is most similar
to sex among the different classifications that receive heightened protection.” (citation
omitted)).
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 1017.
57.
Id. “[T]he Court stated that ‘no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose
and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought
to protect in personhood and dignity.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013)).
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because defendants “failed to show that the ban furthers a legitimate
state interest.”58
She then reviewed Wisconsin’s interests. Crabb first explored
tradition, which “can be important because it often reflects lessons of
experience,”59 but deemed critical the reasons underlying traditions and
that courts must decide whether they satisfy equal protection.60
Traditions also “may endure because of unexamined assumptions about
a particular class of people rather than because the laws serve the
community as a whole,”61 prompting the Supreme Court to say that the
“[a]ncient lineage of a legal concept does not give it immunity from
attack for lacking a rational basis.”62 “Thus, if blind adherence to the
past is the only justification for the law, it must fail.”63 Crabb found
that the most common defense was “that procreation is the primary
purpose of marriage and that same-sex couples cannot procreate with
each other.”64 A problem with this idea was how denying same-sex
couples marriage “encourage[s] opposite-sex couples to have
children.”65 Another was obvious: “if the reason same-sex couples
cannot marry is that they cannot procreate, then why are opposite-sex
couples who cannot or will not procreate allowed to marry?”66
The third was optimal child rearing, which the judge found experts
and jurists have seriously questioned and conflicts with the second.67
Even if courts “assume that children fare better with two biological
parents,” four reasons undercut the idea.68 First, it was “another
incredibly underinclusive argument.”69 “Second, even if being raised by
two biological parents provides the ‘optimal’ environment on average,

58.
Id. at 1018. Similarly, the level of scrutiny applied did not matter because
Crabb concluded that the marriage ban failed constitutional review under the equal
protection clause regardless of what level of scrutiny she applied. Id. at 1016.
59.
Id. at 1018 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Julaine K. Appling, Jo
Egelhoff, Jaren E. Hiller, Richard Kessenich & Edmund L. Webster at 7, Wolf v.
Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (No. 14-cv-64)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
60.
Id. The U.S. has rejected “darker traditions,” namely slavery, as denials
of equality. Id. at 1019.
61.
Id.
62.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 326
(1993)).
63.
Id. at 1020 (citing O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 1021.
67.
Id. at 1022.
68.
Id. at 1023.
69.
Id.
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this would not necessarily justify a discriminatory law.”70 Third,
whether or not same-sex couples are married, some will rear children,
as they long have, so the ban’s most direct effect was fostering “less
than optimal results for children of same-sex parents by stigmatizing
them and depriving them of the benefits that marriage could provide.”71
Finally, defendants also did not “explain how banning same-sex
marriage helps to insure that more children are raised by an
opposite-sex couple.”72
She assessed the fourth idea, protecting the marital institution, and
doubted that the Court would even find this interest legitimate.73 It
“suffer[ed] from the same problem of underinclusiveness as the other
asserted interests,”74 and no cogent argument supported defendants’
“belief that allowing same-sex couples to marry somehow will lead to
the de-valuing of children in marriage or have some other adverse
effect on the marriages of heterosexual couples.”75 “Under any amount
of heightened scrutiny, this interest undoubtedly fails.”76
Crabb ended by urging that marriage equality had been elusive for
decades, as courts and citizens were slow to “appreciate that the
guarantees of liberty and equality in the Constitution should not be
denied because of an individual’s sexual orientation.”77 She intimated
that jurists seem to be approaching “a consensus that it is time to
embrace full legal equality for gay and lesbian citizens,” as evidenced
by Windsor and later opinions.78 Crabb asserted that she had a duty to
resolve plaintiffs’ claims now by applying many Court cases,79 which
convinced her that plaintiffs merit the same treatment as heterosexual
couples and the laws were unconstitutional.80

70.
Id. With heightened scrutiny, the state “may ‘not rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of’ different
groups.” Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
71.
Id. (citing Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 963–64
(Mass. 2003)).
72.
Id. She, thus, concluded that the ban cannot be justified as furthering
optimal results for children. Id. at 1024.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. at 1025. Thus, she doubted “whether defendants’ belief even has a
rational basis.” Id.
76.
Id. The “wait and see” idea repeated concerns about same-sex marriages’
potential adverse effects. Id.
77.
Id. at 1027. Initial resistance is evidence that justice moves slowly, not
proof that claims lack merit. Id. at 1026–27.
78.
Id. at 1027.
79.
Id. at 1027–28.
80.
Id. at 1028.
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From Crabb’s June 6 decision until her June 13 stay, clerks issued
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and “about 500 couples” wed.81
At the injunction and stay hearing, she modified plaintiffs’ suggested
injunction and ruled that the Supreme Court’s order staying the Utah
injunction bound her.82
B. Seventh Circuit
Wisconsin promptly appealed. The Seventh Circuit combined
Wisconsin’s case with a similar Indiana appeal and swiftly affirmed.83
Judge Richard Posner reiterated the Supreme Court’s insistence that
equal protection does not allow “courts to judge the wisdom, fairness,
or logic of legislative choices . . . . [And a] classification that neither
proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional
rights must be upheld . . . if there is any reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis for” it.84 He said Wisconsin
offered no “reasonable basis” to forbid same-sex marriage and more
was required because the “challenged discrimination is . . . along
suspect lines.”85 State discrimination “against a minority” premised on
an immutable characteristic “occurring against an historical background
of discrimination . . . makes the discriminatory law or policy
constitutionally suspect,”86 creating a presumption that it denies equal
protection, which only a compelling showing that the discrimination’s
benefits to “society as a whole clearly outweigh” its victims’ harms can
rebut.87
81.
Jason Stein & Patrick Marley, Gay Marriages to Resume in Wisconsin as
Supreme Court Rejects Appeal, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/gay-marriages-to-resume-in-wisconsin-assupreme-court-rejects-appeals-b99365650z1-278229621.html. The stay created “legal
limbo.” Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 7, Bloechl-Karlsen v. Walker,
No. 14-cv-627 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 17, 2014). The state would not recognize their
marriages during the appeal, so four couples filed a recognition suit, see id., which
certiorari’s denial vitiated. See Bloechl-Karlsen v. Walker - Freedom to Marry in
Wisconsin, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/bloechl-karlsen-v-walker-freedommarry-wisconsin (last updated Sept. 17, 2014); infra note 114.
82.
Wolf, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 870 (citing Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893
(2014)). “[Governor] Scott Walker, in his official capacity, is permanently enjoined to
direct all [his appointees and their agents] to treat same-sex couples the same as
different sex couples in the context of processing a marriage license or determining the
rights, protections, obligations or benefits of marriage.” Id. at 872.
83.
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F. 3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
84.
Id. at 654 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313
(1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted); supra note 41 and accompanying text.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Id. at 654–55.
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The major focus was “the states’ arguments, which [we]re based
largely on the assertion that banning same-sex marriage is justified by
the state’s interest in channeling procreative sex into (necessarily
heterosexual) marriage,” and he engaged the “arguments on their own
terms,”88 permitting resolution based on four questions.89 The cases
were “straightforward,” as
[t]he challenged laws discriminate[d] against a minority
defined by an immutable characteristic, and the only rationale
that the states put forth with any conviction—that same-sex
couples and their children don’t need marriage because
same-sex couples can’t produce children, intended or
unintended—is so full of holes that it cannot be taken
seriously.90
The discrimination was “irrational, and therefore unconstitutional even
if . . . not subjected to heightened scrutiny.”91
Posner first asked if the ban “discriminat[ed] against homosexuals
by denying them a right . . . grant[ed] to heterosexuals.”92 There is
“little doubt that sexual orientation, the ground of the discrimination, is

88.
Id. at 655. Posner found the “approach . . . straightforward but . . .
wrapped . . . in a formidable doctrinal terminology—the terminology of rational basis,
of strict, heightened, and intermediate scrutiny, of narrow tailoring, fundamental rights,
and the rest.” Id.
89.
Id.
1. Does the challenged practice involve discrimination, rooted in a
history of prejudice, against some identifiable group of persons, resulting in
unequal treatment harmful to them?
2. Is the unequal treatment based on some immutable or at least
tenacious characteristic of the people discriminated against . . . ? . . . .
3. Does the discrimination, even if [so based], nevertheless confer
an important offsetting benefit on society as a whole? . . . .
4. Though it does confer an offsetting benefit, is the discriminatory
policy overinclusive because the benefit it confers on society could be
achieved [less harmfully], or underinclusive because the government’s
purported rationale . . . implies that it should equally apply to other groups
as well?
Id. The first two comport with the “formulas for what entitles a
discriminated-against group to heightened scrutiny . . . and questions 3 and 4
capture the essence of the Supreme Court’s approach in heightened-scrutiny
cases . . . .” Id. at 656.
90.
Id.
91.
Id. This is why he elided closer cases’ more complex analysis and
eschewed due process analysis. Id. at 656–57.
92.
Id. at 657.
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an immutable . . . characteristic,”93 and “[t]he harm to homosexuals
. . . of being denied the right to marry is considerable.”94 He found
“considerable” marriage’s “tangible as distinct from . . . psychological
benefits,” which also inure to the marriage’s children, enumerating
many under state law.95 Posner deemed “[o]f great importance
[marriage’s] extensive federal benefits.”96 Their denial prompted
Windsor’s invocation because its criticisms “apply with even greater
force to [state] law.”97 He then recited Windsor’s lengthy description of
federal benefits that DOMA denied married same-sex couples,
believing particularly relevant its determination that this imposes
economic harm on the couples’ children.98 Posner said that analysis
made apparent that the states’ “groundless rejection of same-sex
marriage . . . must be a denial of equal protection” and, thus, both
jurisdictions must show “a clearly offsetting governmental interest” to
prevail.99 Whether either had done so was the only remaining issue,
“and the balance of th[e] opinion is devoted to it.”100
He rejected state arguments for bans.101 First, Indiana and
Wisconsin argued for tradition, which “runs head on into Loving v.
Virginia,”102 as many states by tradition confined marriage to persons of
the same race when the Court invalidated it.103 Thus, if a tradition
confers no social benefit “and it is written into law and it discriminates
against a number of people and does them harm beyond just offending
93.
Id. Wisconsin did not dispute this. Id.
94.
Id. at 658. “Because homosexuality is [involuntary] and homosexuals are
among the most stigmatized, misunderstood, and discriminated-against minorities in the
history of the world, the disparagement of their sexual orientation, implicit in the denial
of marriage rights . . . is a source of continuing pain . . . .” Id.
95.
Id. “Because Wisconsin allows domestic partnerships, some spousal
benefits are available to same-sex couples in that state. But others are not . . . .” Id.
96.
Id. There are many, such as “social security spousal and surviving-spouse
benefits.” Id.
97.
Id. at 659. He applied to state bans the litany of harms caused by denial
that Windsor enumerated. Id. (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694
(2013)).
98.
Id. “It raises the cost of health care . . . . denies or reduces benefits
allowed to families upon the loss of a spouse and parent . . . . [and] divests married
same-sex couples of the duties and responsibilities that are an essential part of married
life . . . .” Id. (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695).
99.
Id. The focus here is Wisconsin, but he treated Indiana similarly. Id.
100. Id. He affirmed Crabb’s treatment of Baker, saying that it was decided in
“the dark ages so far as litigation over discrimination against homosexuals is
concerned.” Id. at 660. Lawrence, Romer, and Windsor “make clear that Baker is no
longer authoritative. Id.; see supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
101. Baskin, 766 F. 3d at 660–72.
102. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
103. Baskin, 766 F. 3d at 666 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. 1).
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them . . . it is a violation of the equal protection clause.”104 Second,
Indiana and Wisconsin argued that the ban’s retention is prudent and
cautious, and they should be permitted to collect adequate data before
transforming society’s cornerstone.105 Yet, a state must provide “some
evidence, some reason to believe, however speculative and tenuous,
that allowing same-sex marriage will or may transform” the
institution.106 Because the percentage of Americans who are homosexual
is small, “it is sufficiently implausible that allowing same-sex marriage
would cause palpable harm to family, society, or civilization to require
the state to tender evidence justifying its fears; it . . . provided
none.”107 Posner considered Wisconsin’s last claim—“that the ban on
same-sex marriage is the outcome of a democratic process”108—but
repeated that “homosexuals are only a small part of the state’s
population,” and said, “Minorities trampled on by the democratic
process have recourse to the courts; the recourse is called constitutional
law.”109 He urged that “more than unsupported conjecture that
same-sex marriage will harm heterosexual marriage or children or any
other . . . interest . . . is necessary to justify discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation,” and Wisconsin’s reasons “[we]re not only
conjectural; they [we]re totally implausible.”110
Wisconsin quickly sought certiorari,111 arguing that its case was
“the ideal vehicle to fully and finally resolve all issues regarding this
compelling nationwide ‘debate between two competing views of
marriage,’”112 and requested a Seventh Circuit stay, which was
104. Id. at 667.
105. Id. at 668.
106. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The “only study” that the Seventh
Circuit discovered found that permitting “same-sex marriage has no effect on the
heterosexual marriage rate.” Id. at 668 (citing Marcus Dillender, The Death of
Marriage? The Effects of New Forms of Legal Recognition on Marriage Rates in the
United States, 51 DEMOGRAPHY 563 (2014)).
107. Id. at 668–69.
108. Id. at 671. The people amended the Wisconsin Constitution. Id.
109. Id. He dismissed a fourth argument, that “same-sex marriage is analogous
in its effects to no-fault divorce, which, the state argue[d], makes marriage fragile and
unreliable,” because “Wisconsin has no-fault divorce” and presented no evidence that
same-sex marriage, “or for that matter . . . no-fault divorce,” has such deleterious
effects on the institution. Id. at 666.
110. Id. at 671.
111. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Walker v. Wolf, No. 14-278 (U.S. Sept.
9, 2014), 2014 WL 4418689; Jason Stein, Van Hollen Appeals Gay Marriage Case to
U.S. Supreme Court, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.jsonline.
com/news/statepolitics/van-hollen-appeals-gay-marriage-case-to-us-supreme-courtb99347908z1-274492491.html.
112. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 111, at 6 (quoting United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting)).
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granted.113 In October, the Supreme Court “declined to take the
Wisconsin case and ones from four other states,” which lifted stays and
permitted same-sex marriages in Wisconsin and the other
jurisdictions.114 When the Sixth Circuit upheld bans, the Supreme Court
granted review.115
C. Supreme Court
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Obergefell v. Hodges116 majority,
opened by saying, “The Constitution promises liberty to all . . . to
define and express their identity,” which petitioners sought “by
marrying someone of the same sex and having their marriages deemed
lawful” identically to opposite-sex couples.117 “[T]he annals of human
history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage,” and its
“centrality . . . to the human condition” shows why “the institution has
existed for millennia across civilizations.”118 Marriage’s history “is one
of both continuity and change,”119 and evolving “understandings of
marriage” define a country in which freedom’s new aspects “become
apparent to new generations.”120 “This dynamic can be seen in the
Nation’s experiences with the rights of gays and lesbians.”121 Kennedy
said that “same-sex couples [recently] began to lead more open and
public lives,” prompting “extensive discussion . . . and . . . a shift in
public attitudes toward greater tolerance.”122 He traced the Court’s
cases on “the legal status of homosexuals,”123 the 1993 Hawaii and
2003 Massachusetts Supreme Court marriage opinions,124 and the 1996

113. Order, Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-2526 (7th Cir. Sept. 17, 2014).
114. Patrick Marley, Judge Makes Clear Wisconsin Gay Marriages Can
Proceed, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.jsonline.com/news/
statepolitics/judge-makes-clear-wisconsin-gay-marriages-can-proceed-b99367384z1278526781.html; see Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 316 (2014) (mem.).
115. See supra note 13.
116. No. 14-556 (U.S. June 26, 2015).
117. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 1–2 (U.S. June 26, 2015).
The parties’ factual situations illuminated the urgency of this case. Id. at 4.
118. Id. at 3.
119. Id. at 6. This worked “deep transformations in its structure” that
strengthened marriage. Id. at 7.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 8. These were manifested in litigation over LGBT rights. Id.
123. Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
124. Id at 8–9 (citing Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v.
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)).
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Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) passage and 2013 Court
invalidation.125 Kennedy observed that “[n]umerous cases about
same-sex marriage ha[d] reached the United States Courts of Appeals in
recent years,” district courts have issued “many thoughtful”
opinions,126 and the states were divided after “years of litigation,
legislation, referenda, and the discussions that attended these public
acts.”127
The opinion mainly relied on due process, which protects
fundamental liberties, including most in the Bill of Rights, and
“personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy.”128
Kennedy deemed “[t]he identification and protection of [these]
rights . . . an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the
Constitution,”129 finding that “[h]istory and tradition guide and
discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.”130 He said
that the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment drafters and ratifiers
“did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its
dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter
protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its
meaning.”131 “Applying th[o]se established precepts,” Kennedy
asserted, “the Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the
Constitution.”132 He found “instructive” cases that “have expressed
constitutional principles of broader reach,” as they “identified essential
attributes of [the marriage] right based in history, tradition, and other
constitutional liberties inherent in this intimate bond.”133 Kennedy
argued that “in assessing whether the force and rationale of its cases
125. Id. at 9 (citing Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012); United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)). The Court invalidated section 3,
“Definition of Marriage.” Id.
126. Id. at 9–10. Plaintiffs won most. Id. at 10; see supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
127. Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip op. at 10.
128. Id. Examples “includ[e] intimate choices that define personal identity and
beliefs.” Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484–86 (1965)).
129. Id. Judges use “reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so
fundamental that the State must accord them its respect.” Id.
130. Id. at 10–11. Judges “respect[] . . . history and learn[] from it without
allowing the past alone to rule the present.” Id. at 11.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 12. He said three modern cases “describing the right to marry
presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners,” but the times informed this
assumption. Id. at 11–12 (discussing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). That
explains Baker v. Nelson. Id. at 12 (discussing Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972));
see supra text accompanying notes 18–20.
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apply to same-sex couples, the Court must respect the basic reasons
why the right to marry has been long protected.”134
This analysis “compel[led] [his] conclusion that same-sex couples
may exercise the right to marry,” as “four principles and traditions . . .
demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the
Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.”135 First,
Kennedy observed “that the right to personal choice regarding marriage
is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy,” because “decisions
concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can
make.”136 The majority also stated, “The nature of marriage is that,
through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other
freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality,” which “is
true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation.”137 Second, the
opinion cited the “principle . . . that the right to marry is fundamental
because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals,”138 and concluded that
“same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy
intimate association.”139
Third, Kennedy argued that “protecting the right to marry . . .
safeguards children and families,”140 and that while “some of
marriage’s protections . . . are material. . . . [M]arriage also confers
more profound benefits.”141 Exclusion from marriage violates “a central
premise of the right to marry,” as children are stigmatized by “knowing
their families are somehow lesser.”142 Finally, Kennedy found, in Court
opinions and traditions, that “marriage is a keystone of our social
order,” an idea seen in mounting “rights, benefits and responsibilities”

134. Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip op. at 12.
135. Id.
136. Id. They are “[l]ike choices concerning contraception, family
relationships, procreation, and childrearing.” Id.
137. Id. at 13 (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013)).
138. Id. It “dignifies couples who ‘wish to define themselves by their
commitment to each other.’” Id. at 14 (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689).
139. Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)).
140. Id. “[T]he right to marry . . . draws meaning from related rights of
childrearing, procreation, and education,” which the Court “has recognized . . . as a
unified whole” Id. (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Pierce v.
Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
141. Id. at 15. “By giving recognition and legal structure to their parents’
relationship, marriage allows children ‘to understand the integrity and closeness of their
own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily
lives.’” Id. (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694).
142. Id. They lack “the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage
offers.” Id.
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which states bestow on married couples.143 The opinion detected “no
difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this
principle,” yet the latter’s exclusion from marriage means that they lose
the “the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to
marriage,”144 which violates the fundamental right to marry while
“impos[ing] stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic
charter.”145
The majority conceded that Glucksberg required a narrow
definition of due process liberty “with central reference to specific
historical practice,” but it was inconsistent with treatment of
fundamental rights to marry and intimacy.146 The marriage cases
addressed the right “in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a
sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the
right.”147 Defining rights by who previously exercised them would
allow historical practices to “serve as their own continued justification”
and prevent new groups from “invok[ing] rights once denied,” which
the Court “has rejected . . . both with respect to the right to marry and
the rights of gays and lesbians.”148 Kennedy deemed the right to marry
“fundamental as a matter of history and tradition” yet said rights
emanate “from a better informed understanding of how constitutional
imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent” today.149 He observed
that many who find same-sex marriage wrong base this on “decent and
honorable religious or philosophical premises,”150 but once “sincere,
personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy,” it stamps
the government’s “imprimatur . . . on an exclusion that soon demeans
or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied.”151 When
“same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as
opposite-sex couples,” denying them this right “disparage[s] their
choices and diminish[es] their personhood.”152
The majority urged that same-sex couples’ right to marry also
derives from equal protection, as that clause and due process “are
143. Id. at 16–17.
144. Id. at 17. This poses material hurdles and instability, “teaching that gays
and lesbians are unequal in important respects.” Id.
145. Id. at 18.
146. Id. He suggested that the treatment in Glucksberg may have been proper
for the right to physician-assisted suicide asserted. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 18–19.
150. Id. at 19.
151. Id.; see id. at 27 (stressing that the First Amendment protects religions
and adherents to religious doctrines who continue opposing marriage equality).
152. Id. at 19.
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connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent
principles.”153 In specific cases, each “may rest on different precepts”
and one or the other may “capture the essence of the right in a more
accurate and comprehensive way, even as the[y] may converge in the
identification and definition of the right.”154 “This dynamic . . . applies
to same-sex marriage,” as “the challenged laws burden the liberty of
same-sex couples and . . . abridge central precepts of equality,”155
“den[y] all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and . . . bar
[ them] from exercising a fundamental right.”156 Thus, equal protection,
as due process, “prohibits this unjustified infringement of the
fundamental right to marry.”157
The factors above prompted “the conclusion that the right to marry
is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under
[both clauses] couples of the same same-sex may not be deprived of
that right and that liberty.”158 The Court held “that same-sex couples
may exercise the fundamental right to marry,” overruled Baker, and
invalidated state laws “to the extent they exclude same-sex couples
from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex
couples.”159
Kennedy addressed the concern that judges should “proceed with
caution—to await further legislation, litigation, and debate,”160 deeming
the Sixth Circuit’s argument “cogent” but finding “far more
deliberation than this argument acknowledges.”161 He said, “Of course,
the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process
for change, so long as that process does not abridge fundamental
rights,”162 recognizing that the plurality in Schuette v. BAMN163
confirmed the importance of this notion and constitutional freedom,
which secures “the right of the individual not to be injured by the

153. Id.
154. Id. This increases appreciation of “what freedom is and must become.”
Id. The majority stated that “[t]he Court’s cases,” which address “invidious sex-based
classifications in marriage” and “the rights of gays and lesbians,” “reflect this
dynamic.” Id. at 19, 21–22.
155. Id. at 22.
156. Id. They impose a “disability on gays and lesbians,” which “disrespect[s]
and subordinate[s] them.” Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 22–23.
160. Id. at 23.
161. Id. “This has led to an enhanced understanding of the issue.” Id.
162. Id. at 24.
163. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).

98

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW FORWARD

unlawful exercise of governmental power.”164 Despite “the more
general value of democratic decisionmaking,” the Constitution
mandates judicial redress for violations of individual rights.165 Thus,
injured parties can “vindicate their own direct, personal stake” in the
Constitution, “even if the broader public disagrees and even if the
legislature refuses to act,” as the document “withdr[e]w certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy.”166
D. Responses and Lessons from Wisconsin
Supreme Court denial of Wisconsin’s certiorari petition and the
Obergefell decision clarified marriage equality in Wisconsin, prompting
the Governor and the Attorney General to announce that Wisconsin
would recognize same-sex unions and implement equality.167 The
confusion that followed Crabb’s opinion and stay dissipated rather
quickly.168 Public officials seemed to adopt concerted efforts that would
thoroughly institute recognition of same-sex marriages, affording
same-sex spouses all of the rights and benefits of heterosexual
spouses.169
Equality’s arrival in Wisconsin had many practical impacts, most
crucially on myriad same-sex couples and their children, who now
enjoy marriage equality’s numerous advantages while experiencing less
stigma, humiliation, and prejudice.170 Tangible benefits include

164. Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip op. at 24 (quoting Schuette, 134 S. Ct.
1636).
165. Id. This is true, even when the protection of rights “affects issues of the
utmost importance and sensitivity.” Id.
166. Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943)). It places “fundamental rights[, which] may not be submitted to a vote,”
“beyond the reach of majorities,” making them “legal principles to be applied by the
courts.” Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638).
167. The Governor and Attorney General remained opposed. Stein & Marley,
supra note 81; Marley, supra note 114.
168. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
169. E.g., Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in Wisconsin: Information for
Members and Employers, WIS. DEP’T EMP. TR. FUNDS (Oct. 15, 2014),
http://www.etf.wi.gov/news/ht-2014-same-sex-marriage2.htm; Same-Sex Couples,
WIS. DEP’T REVENUE (Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.revenue.wi.gov/faqs/ise/
samesex.html; see Jason Stein, Plaintiffs in Gay Marriage Case Seek More Than $1
Million in Costs, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.jsonline.com/
news/plaintiffs-in-gay-marriage-case-seek-more-than-1-million-in-costs-b99408980z1285838141.html.
170. I rely in this and the next two sentences on Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip
op. at 14–16, Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 658 (7th Cir. 2014), and Bostic v.
Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476–80 (E.D. Va. 2014). See supra notes 95–100 and
accompanying text.
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economic gains and security, namely involving taxation, health care,
and adoption. Less tangible ones encompass recognition, citizenship,
stability, legitimacy, respect, companionship, and emotional and
psychological support. Equality also yielded integral symbolic effects.
Since at least 1987, Wisconsin has been a defendant in critical litigation
regarding social change, which sought, for example, to increase
children’s protection from abuse,171 voting rights172 and reproductive
freedom.173 In sum, many citizens’ endeavors brought Wisconsin
marriage equality to which the state was receptive.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. Wisconsin
Wisconsin officers, particularly the Governor and Attorney
General, must continue fully effectuating the Obergefell and Wolf
mandates by insuring that same-sex couples receive treatment akin to
opposite-sex couples.174 Wolf’s nascent implementation proved
constructive, but officials must redouble their endeavors to guarantee
that the promise of comprehensive marriage equality becomes a
reality.175 The legislature ought to fully assess Wisconsin laws and
revise any that preclude same-sex couples from achieving complete

171. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th
Cir. 1987), aff’d, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). See generally LYNNE CURRY, THE DESHANEY
CASE: CHILD ABUSE, FAMILY RIGHTS, AND THE DILEMMA OF STATE INTERVENTION
(2007).
172. Frank v. Walker, 766 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2014), staying 17 F. Supp. 3d
837 (E.D. Wis. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014); see Adam Liptak, Courts Strike
Down Voter ID Laws in Wisconsin and Texas, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://nyti.ms/1CZwzAw.
173. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, No. 13-cv-465-wmc,
2013 WL 3989238 (W.D. Wis. 2013), aff’d, 738 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014); Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Wis.
1997), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999), reh’g en banc
denied, 198 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1999); Jason Stein & Dana Ferguson, U.S. Supreme
Court Rejects Wisconsin Appeal over Abortion Law, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (June 23,
2014), http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/justices-reject-wisconsin-appeal-overabortion-law-b99297080z1-264238031.html.
174. See supra text accompanying note 167; see also Jenna Johnson, Scott
Walker: Constitutional Amendment on Gay Marriage Is Not a Top Focus, WASH. POST
(July 31, 2015), http://wpo.st/_str0.
175. See supra text accompanying note 169; see also Betsy Woodruff, Scott
Walker’s Next Question, SLATE (Feb. 24, 2015, 11:12 AM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/02/scott_walker_and_gay_marriage_why_won_
t_wisconsin_s_governor_give_a_clear.html.
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marriage equality.176 The Wisconsin bench should be responsive to legal
efforts that persons who are in or want to enter or leave same-sex
marriages pursue by, for instance, generally treating lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) litigants as opposite-sex people and
couples when resolving adoption, divorce, and custody suits.
Some are concerned that marriage equality could violate ban
proponents’ religious liberty. Examples are judges, clerk of court staff
who issue marriage licenses, and vendors, like florists and bakers,
whom states will putatively require to facilitate activities, including
same-sex marriages, that infringe their religious beliefs.177 No material
apparently shows that conduct has occurred in Wisconsin. If evidence
of this behavior surfaces, lawmakers must gather, evaluate, and
synthesize relevant data and, should this evince problems, devise
remedies.178
B. Other States
The vast majority of states have complied with Obergefell’s
mandate by instituting efforts to guarantee same-sex couples all of the
rights and benefits accorded opposite-sex couples; however, certain
states and numerous localities have not implemented full marriage
equality or have moved slowly.179 They must promptly insure that
comprehensive marriage equality becomes a reality by consulting
endeavors in Wisconsin and other states and localities that have
expeditiously instituted thorough equality, as the Supreme Court has
clearly spoken and made equality the law of the land.180 If state or local
officials refuse to implement full marriage equality or move very
slowly, people or entities filing earlier litigation may wish to reopen it

176. Some states have moved slowly. E.g., Alan Blinder, In Alabama, One
County Exits the Marriage Business, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015, 12:16 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/live/supreme-court-rulings/in-alabama-one-county-exits-themarriage-business; Erik Eckholm & Manny Fernandez, After Same-Sex Marriage
Ruling, Southern States Fall in Line, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015), http://nyti.ms/
1SZ9KoB; see infra text accompanying notes 181, 185.
177. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marriage of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and
Religious Liberty Protections, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161 (2014); Erik Eckholm,
Conservative Lawmakers and Faith Groups Seek Exemptions After Same-Sex Ruling,
N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1HluJjn; see infra note 181.
178. Wilson, supra note 177; see SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008).
179. Editorial, Illegal Defiance on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (July 10,
2015), http://nyti.ms/1UIr3Mx; see sources cited supra notes 176–177, infra note 181.
180. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975).
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and perhaps suggest that federal judges hold officials in contempt.181
Should these parties eschew suit, others injured by the failure to
implement equality might consider litigation that seeks to vindicate their
rights. State and local governments must also ensure that efforts to
secure equality do not violate religious freedom.182
In the many states that have not extended protection from
discrimination to LGBT individuals, legislatures and localities must
seriously consider passing measures that proscribe discrimination in
employment, education, and other spheres.183 Indeed, Wisconsin
adopted the first state law that proscribed discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.184 State and local elected officials could model bills
and ordinances on laws enacted by states and localities which have
barred that discrimination or on the recently introduced federal Equality
Act.185
C. United States
The Executive Branch granted federal benefits to same-sex couples
in states with bans soon after tribunals, including the Supreme Court,
invalidated them.186 Because numerous states and local subdivisions
181. Examples are Alabama and Kentucky litigation. Strawser v. Strange, No.
14-0424-CG-C (S.D. Ala. Sept. 9, 2015); Miller v. Davis, Civ. Act. No. 15-44-DLB
(E.D. Ky. Nov. 5, 2015); see Sandhya Somashekhar & Robert Barnes, Supreme Court
Rejects County Official’s Request in Gay-Marriage Case, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2015),
http://wpo.st/ofur0; Blinder, supra note 176; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Says
Kentucky Clerk Must Let Gay Couples Marry, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1LPeXPF.
182. For ideas, see sources cited supra notes 177–178.
183. See In Your State, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-yourstate (last visited Dec. 17, 2015); Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map
(last
visited Dec. 17, 2015).
184. Act of Mar. 2, 1982, ch. 112, 1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 901; William B.
Turner, The Gay Rights State: Wisconsin’s Pioneering Legislation to Prohibit
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 91 (2007).
185. S. 1858, 114th Cong. (2015); e.g., Assemb. 8070, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2013) (Women’s Equality act); HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 2014 STATE
EQUALITY INDEX (2015), available at http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/sei-2014view-your-states-scorecard.
186. E.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Lynch Announces
Federal Marriage Benefits Available to Same-Sex Couples Nationwide (July 9, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-lynch-announces-federal-marriagebenefits-available-same-sex-couples; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, After Supreme
Court Declines to Hear Same-Sex Marriage Cases, Attorney General Holder
Announces Federal Government to Recognize Couples in Seven New States (Oct. 17,
2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/after-supreme-court-declines-hear-same-sexmarriage-cases-attorney-general-holder-announces.

102

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW FORWARD

may be reluctant to adopt measures that guarantee full equality,
Congress must carefully analyze the new Equality Act that bans
discrimination against LGBT people in the U.S., which Senator Tammy
Baldwin (D-WI) co-sponsored.187 The Judiciary Committees might
survey all fifty states’ protections and conduct hearings on the bills.
Despite the need for this legislation, Congress may not pass it ahead of
the 2016 elections.
CONCLUSION
Same-sex marriage is legal nationwide, and Wisconsin figured
prominently in that effort. Judge Crabb’s careful invalidation of the
state’s constitutional ban, her decision’s affirmance by the Seventh
Circuit, and Obergefell brought full marriage equality to Wisconsin
before numerous states. Thus, jurisdictions that have not experienced
comprehensive equality should implement it by consulting Wisconsin’s
example.
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